This article was first published in 1985 written by DBS Jeyaraj. Frontline Magazine is publised by the publishers of ‘THE HINDU’
TO the Western media they are guerillas, insurgents, separatists and rebels; sections of the Indian press describe them as nationalists, patriots and liberation fighters; back home the state which they oppose feels they are extremists, Marxists and plain terrorists; the people whose cause they claim to serve refer to them as the boys or the movement. Their own self-perception is that of revolutionary freedom-fighters seeking to liberate their people from oppression.
They are the militant organisations of the Sri Lankan Tamils who have adopted armed resistance as their creed in a bid to establish an independent state – Eelam, comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island. All militants are united on three aspects. A common aim – Eelam – is one. Common opposition to the present regime is another. Violent struggle as the means to the end is the third. But there ends the unity. For, despite the saying that adversity makes strange bedfellows, the Tamil militants remain divided. Personality clashes in the upper echelons of the movements, differences of ideological opinion, disagreement on strategy and methods, and so on are some reasons keeping the militants apart.
THE FAMOUS FIVE
Another point is the multiplicity of the groups. A recent count put the number at 23. They are of different kinds and hues. Some are well-organised and firmly entrenched on their native soil. Others are yet to develop as potent forces. Some are splinters who have defected or been expelled from major groups. A few have mushroomed around a particular village and adjacent areas; one or two are essentially trying to win freedom through stationery and pen. The groups that matter can be counted on the fingers of one’s hand.
The famous five are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS).
Of the other groups, one is the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), a breakaway from TELO. It was founded by an ex-employee of the Hotel Lanka Oberoi, known as “Oberoi” Devan. TELO has been deteriorating since his death. The group is supposed to be sitting on a large cache of weapons. It split into two recently. The Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) is led by Maheswaran, a one-time engineering student of the London University. Maheswaran, known as “Panagoda” for having escaped from the Army detention camp at the particular town, was detained in Madras also in connection with the Meenambakkam airport explosion. TEA pulled off the greatest bank robbery to date in Sri Lanka when it made off with 35 million Sri Lanka rupees from the Kattankudi People’s Bank. Some of the other groups are NLFT, TENA, TELE, RELO, ATAK, the Red Army, the Revolutionary Assembly and TEDC.
As far as the major groups are concerned, the LTTE, led by Prabakaran, has perhaps the most colourful past, active for over a decade. It claims credit for several incidents like the ambush of a CID team led by Inspector Bastianpillai, the bombing of an Avro, the ambush of 13 Army personnel preceding the 1983 violence and attacks on police stations and armed convoys. The Tigers have been constantly waging what they term as a guerilla war against the state. Their symbol, the Tiger, appeals to deep-seated nostalgia for a glorious Tamilian past – the halcyon days of the Cholas when the Tiger flag fluttered proudly. Today, to the average Tamil, the term “Tiger” is synonymous with the militant Tamil while in Sri Lanka the Sinhala word ‘Kotiya’ (tiger) is a derogatory reference to Tamils.
The group was formed in 1972. It changed its name from Tamil New Tigers to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976.
Umamaheswaran, an ex-surveyor, is the leader of PLOT. He was at one time the chairman of the Tigers’ executive council. He broke away and formed PLOT in 1980. The first-ever attack on a police station in the Lankan Tamil areas was pioneered by PLOT when it raided the Anaicottai police station in 1981. It was also responsible for the Kilinochchi bank robbery and the killing of several policemen. PLOT also operates a clandestine broadcasting station known as Voice of Tamil Eelam which conducts programmes in Tamil, English and Sinhala.
PUBLICITY - SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
The present leader of TELO is Sri Sabaratnam. It was set up by Thangathurai who, along with the controversial Kuttimani, was killed in the riot at Welikade prison. It remained a loosely knit group until 1973 when an organisational structure was formed. The group gunned down several Tamil police officers in the North. TELO received great publicity when its leader Thangathurai and Kuttimani were sentenced to death in 1982. Sri Sabaratnam took over in 1983. TELO made headlines recently by its operations in Chavakachcheri and Murukandy.
The chief of EPRLF is Padmanabha. It is a metamorphosis of earlier student and youth organisations dating back to 1975. The EPRLF umbrella was formed in 1981. It came into the open in 1983. The organisation comprises student, peasant, women, fishermen and worker groups. The front, which claimed a role in the Batticaloa prison break-out in 1983, received wide publicity by abducting an American couple last year. Recently it claimed responsibility for attacks on the Gurunagar Army cantonment and the Karainagar naval base.
EROS has a collective leadership represented by Rajanayagam in London and Balakumar in Madras. Its founder was an economist, Eliathamby Ratnasabapathy, who continues to play a godfather role. EROS had its origin in the Eelam Research Organisation established in London in 1975. It has perhaps the largest array of intellectuals in its fold. Its approach is basically Marxist-Leninist and it frowns upon acts like random killings or robberies. The primary aim is sabotage. EROS shot into the limelight through its three-phased bomb campaign in Colombo. The Oberoi Hotel and the National Security Ministry were the first targets. Oil refinery installations were the next. Thirdly, bombs were placed outside select targets. An attempt was also made on the TV antennae at Mount Pedro.
RELATIVE STRENGTH
The relative strength of the individual groups is another question. There are three main components in all groups – the fighter cadre, the propaganda unit, and the sympathiser reservoir. The fighters are the most important. All groups are wary of revealing their actual numbers and tend to exaggerate. Informed sources told Frontline that the five groups would together have close upon 10,000 fighting men. Numerical strength does not, of course, have a decisive bearing on combat skills or experience. Even the nature and quality of training differs considerably. There is disparity between as well as within the groups on issues like the intensity and period of training. In one assessment, in terms of combat fitness, the actual manpower mobilisation would be about 6,000. Another moot point is the lack of sufficient firepower. There is still a significant shortfall of firearms and dearth of ammunition.
“Which area is the stronghold of a particular group?” The answer is, “we are strong in all areas”. It is true to the extent that all groups are adequately represented in all Tamil areas as far as recruitment and influence are concerned. Recruitment cuts across religious, caste, regional and parochial lines. Each group has its concentration and spheres of special influence in different Tamil areas, with the “Tigers” having real strike power in the Jaffna peninsula and PLOT having its support spread out more widely. All these positions, however, are subject to rapid fluctuation as recruitment, shifts in loyalty, mobility and establishment of bases constitute in themselves an interacting process that is dynamic.
Among the upcountry plantation workers, Tamils of recent Indian origin, EROS and EPRLF enjoy real influence while PLOT is supported by a large number of Muslism.
The immediate challenge facing the militants is the question of unity. Unity is the upper most thought in the Tamil mind. The need of the hour, according to all groups, is not merely unity of purpose but coordinated action. PLOT Secretary-General Umamaheswaran went on the air over his radio and said, “The most important task facing us is the achieving of a degree of unity among the different groups and working out a common programme to face the common enemy. At present we are holding unity talks with a number of like-minded organisations and we have already reached unity with the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army and the National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam”.
EPRLF Secretary-General Padmanabha, addressing the front’s first congress, said, “It is important that we give our utmost attention to the formation of a united front. Today there are five major organisations within the Eelam national liberation movement. A united front has already been formed among EPRLF, EROS and TELO. Our prime task now is to strengthen the existing front and formulate correct tactics for the incorporation of PLOT and LTTE into the united front.”
LTTE ideologue Dr A.S. Balasingham struck an optimistic note when speaking to Frontline. “We feel that escalating conditions will compel the major liberation organisations to evolve a coordinated form of action. Negotiations have already been started between various groups to realise this objective. We are certain that all groups will join together to fight against our common enemy.”
Balakumar of EROS is also hopeful. “There are no fundamental contradictions between us. It is essentially a conflict of opinion which could be resolved in friendship in the interests of greater unity”, he told Frontline. Sri Sabaratnam, leader of TELO, explained: “There is no necessity for all the organisations to team up together. What is required is coordinated action.”
STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES
Obstacles in the way of [their] unity are strategic differences. Umamaheswaran of PLOT holds the following view: “Our differences with LTTE on the matter are basic. We are of the opinion that the hit and run actions of LTTE are putting back the liberation struggle and playing into the hands of [President J.R.] Jayewardene…. This is a short-sighted policy in the long run. I am sure that LTTE too will realise this.”
EPRLF spokesman Varadarajaperumal says his front does not believe in guerilla warfare as a strategy but merely as a tactic. “We do not believe in conventional war also. It was not adopted in any revolutionary struggle,” he says.
R. Vasudeva, additional secretary-general of PLOT, says that in the Sri Lankan context, hit and run policies alone will not succeed. Those tactics alone are not enough. A people’s army is also necessary.
Balakumar of EROS rejects the perpetuation of hit and run tactics. The hit and run policy is effective in the beginning of a guerilla war, thereafter it becomes redundant, he says.
TELO’s Sri Sabaratnam says, “The hit and run tactics were useful to demoralise the enemy when the militant groups were not ready to meet the enemy face to face. All the militant groups that matter are now in a position to meet the enemy face to face when necessary and inflict heavy losses by full-fledged military action…. We are not engaged in guerilla warfare exclusively. All we can say is that all militant groups that matter are now in a position to carry on a protracted war of national liberation.”
Anton Balasingham of the “Tigers” says there is some confusion over the concept of people’s war. “People’s war is not popular insurrection. Guerilla warfare is an aspect of a people’s war. Gradually and systematically, guerilla warfare would clearly evolve into popular warfare. Units of Tamil guerillas will continue with their protracted warfare until the final war of liberation.” He is also hopeful of unity. “No fundamental contradictions exist as far as objectives are concerned – all major groups are committed to similar aims like the formation of an independent socialist Eelam and armed revolutionary struggle as the means to achieve this. Differences lie in methods of armed resistance, which can be resolved by discussions and negotiation.”
A further deterrent to unity is the personality clash between Prabakaran and Umamaheswaran. The bitter feud culminated in a shootout at Pondy Bazaar resulting in both being put behind bars in Madras for a while. There have also been episodes of fratricide between PLOT and LTTE on Eelam soil. Mutual vilification campaigns have also been conducted. A hopeful pointer to the future is that both sides realise the need for unity. An LTTE representative met Umamaheswaran for a preliminary discussion. Another expatriate who is influential with the Tigers also is actively pursuing this line.
Positive signs of a future union lie in the roots of the past itself. An analysis of the origins of each group shows the common seed was sown in 1970 when medium-wise standardisation policies discriminating against Tamils in the higher education sphere were introduced. Student disgruntlement snowballed into open dissent. The demonstration effect of the abortive armed insurgency by Sinhala radicals as well as the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 gave momentum to this dissent. The Pan-Sinhala constitution of 1972, the teargassing of the crowd at the World Tamil Research Conference in 1974 and the suicide of youth leader Sivakumaran helped fuel these feelings to the point of revolt. Most militant leaders have worked together before.
COMMON COMMITMENT
There is no serious ideological cleavage among the Tamil militants. All the groups are committed to a socialist State of Eelam, and EPRLF and EROS are considered truly radical. Common origin, common purpose and lack of basic ideological differences are indeed notable. A group of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka is now actively engaged in promoting unity. A spokesman for the group said the “Tigers” had laid a precondition at one stage that unity could be discussed only if the other groups also entered the fray. The inactivity of the other groups while the “Tigers” were fighting it out, made LTTE suspicious. LTTE was wary of wearing itself out while the other groups were conserving their strength. Today that situation is fast changing, with TELO and EPRLF embarking upon major operations.
The spokesman summed up the situation thus. TELO, EPRLF and EROS have formed a front. PLOT and TELA are together. Actually, the five groups have formed a coordination committee. The “Tigers” are remaining aloof. The basic difference is between PLOT and LTTE. The TELO-EPRLF-EROS umbrella is holding discussions with both PLOT and the “Tigers”. Both sides seem to be acceptable to them. If comprehensive unity cannot be achieved at the initial stage, the trio can align with either PLOT or LTTE and intensify operations. In that context, the third force cannot be inactive. It would fall in line with parallel action that would gradually lead to coordinated action. All small groups would toe the line of the big groups and become progressively assimilated.
There are other factors which also add impetus to the drive for unity. The Tamil people facing great hardship in Sri Lanka are constantly pressuring the groups to unite. The average Sri Lankan Tamil is not partisan towards any group. To him all militants are the “boys” and the current inter-group rivalry demoralises him greatly. If the groups do not take heed of this, they run the risk of losing their support among the people.
The rank and file of the different groups have no basic differences among themselves. Brothers, neighbours, relatives and friends are split among different groups. Thus internal pressure rising from the grass root level is bound to be another motivator.
Many expatriate Tamils who are the main funding agencies are becoming slowly disillusioned. Several of them are actively engaged in promoting unity. Public opinion in India, a country which has shown much openness towards Tamil refugees, is watchful. Indian sentiments both on a State and national level have been advocating unity. Sympathetic newspapers, politicians and student organisations are all urging it.
Last but not least is the growing awareness that taking on the armed might of an organised state requires a pooling of resources and coordinated effort. Such unity would also mean more funds, more arms and more men. Significant political and diplomatic advances in the international arena could also be made. And so the search for militant unity goes on. Time is short and the waters continue to rise. History will record whether the militants will sink or swim together and also how they relate to the overall movement of the Tamils of Sri Lanka, especially the political component represented by TULF [Tamil United Liberation Front].
Kilde: The Hindu
