Developments in neighboring Sri Lanka are triggering unease in India. There is growing concern that President Mahinda Rajapaksa will use his second term to marginalize political rivals rather than seek a political solution to the island’s ethnic conflicts.
The arrest last week of General Sarath Fonseka, former army chief and Rajapaksa’s losing rival in the presidential election in January, is fueling fears that the president is focusing on consolidating the already substantial grip of his family over the levers of power rather than on addressing the country’s bigger problems.
Rajapaksa’s convincingly won the presidential election by a margin of 1.8 million votes. The vote was fiercely fought with the two front-runners and their supporters engaging in personal attacks.
It was far from the days when Fonseka and Rajapaksa partnered in the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that the Sri Lankan army finally won in May last year. The army chief and the premier both tried to take the credit for the victory, with Rajapaksa attempting to sideline Fonseka by “promoting” him to a largely ceremonial post. This was bitterly resented Fonseka, who decided to enter the presidential race as the opposition parties’ main candidate.
Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka have long records of getting even with enemies and silencing dissent, it was only a matter of time before they turned on each other. That the victor in the presidential election would show no mercy on the vanquished was evident in the election campaign.
Rajapaksa did not even wait for results to be officially announced before he began the witch-hunt, with troops surrounding the hotel where Fonseka and his aides were staying. The general was allowed to leave the hotel the next day, but several former army officers who were part of his election campaign team were arrested.
There has been no let-up in the intensity of the crackdown on the Fonseka camp in the weeks since. The president has purged the army of Fonseka supporters. Fourteen senior officers have been forced to retire and around 40 serving and former soldiers arrested. Early last week, troops arrested Fonseka.
While the army is yet to press formal charges against him, a government-owned newspaper says that charges could include “conspiracy to carry out a military coup against the government and a bid to assassinate President Rajapaksa”. He could face a court-martial if the allegations are proved.
Many in Sri Lanka believe that Fonseka and his supporters in the army were plotting a coup and hence deserve to be arrested. Others fear that it is part of a larger strategy to eliminate all opposition to Rajapaksa’s rule.
Sri Lanka has been one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies. But leaders have grown increasingly autocratic and under Rajapaksa the slide towards authoritarian rule has been rapid. This has evoked apprehension in the island and beyond. Several countries have expressed concern over Fonseka’s arrest.
Neighboring India issued a cautious statement after a day’s silence following the arrest. “As a friend and neighbor, we trust that due processes of law will be observed in democratic Sri Lanka,” a spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said.
Officials speaking to Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity said that while India was “no supporter of a general entering politics, it is not happy with Rajapaksa’s undemocratic style”.
During the run-up to the elections, both Rajapaksa and Fonseka seem to have sought India’s support or at least a commitment that India would not sway the all-important Tamil vote by indicating its preference between the two candidates.
Fonseka made a “private visit” to Mumbai, apparently to open a line of communication with Indian political leaders, while Rajapaksa’s brothers, Basil and Gotabhaya – senior advisor to the president and defense secretary respectively – met with top Indian officials as part of a Sri Lankan delegation. They are reported to have briefed Delhi about the steps taken by Rajapaksa to resettle the Tamil Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and to have assured the Indian government of Rajapaksa’s commitment to finding a political solution to the long-running ethnic conflict between the island’s Sinhalese majority and the Tamils and other minorities.
Throughout the presidential campaign India refrained from indicating a preference between the two front-runners. Senior officials told Asia Times Online then that there was little difference between Rajapaksa and Fonseka as both prioritized the military option over a political settlement to deal with ethnic-based problems.
“Rajapaksa stubbornly resisted exploring a political solution right through his first term despite India constantly urging him to do so,” a MEA official pointed out. “And both [Rajapaksa and Fonseka] showed little concern for Tamil civilian lives through the months of aerial bombardment of Tamil areas.”
India saw Rajapaksa and Fonseka as presenting “a choice between the devil and the deep-blue sea,” but Delhi quietly hoped for Rajapaksa’s return to power.
“Rajapaksa is a known devil, unlike Fonseka,” the official said, pointing out that “as a politician, Fonseka was an unknown entity”. A career soldier, Fonseka entered the political arena late last year. But for his political agenda of settling scores with Rajapaksa, little is known of his “vision” for the country.
India knew that Fonseka was pro-Pakistan and China. And that worked in Rajapaksa’s favor. While Sri Lanka warmed to both Pakistan and China during Rajapaksa’s first term, with economic and especially defense ties expanding significantly, “Rajapaksa kept India in the loop right through the war against the LTTE,” a fact that was appreciated in decision-making circles in Delhi.
Another point that worked against Fonseka was that he is an ex-military man. Fonseka resigned before he stepped into the political arena and hence did not enter politics via a military coup, but India was uneasy with a military man taking over the reins in Sri Lanka.
Rajapaksa’s victory therefore evoked a sigh of relief in Delhi
Delhi was hoping that with his re-election out of the way, Rajapaksa would quickly settle down to addressing the ethnic conflict. But there have been no signs or statements issued on this matter in the three weeks since his landslide victory. Instead, the government has been preoccupied with clipping Fonseka’s wings.
Last week, the president dissolved parliament and announced that general elections would be held in April. What can be expected from him and other politicians in the coming weeks is campaign rhetoric on the ethnic issue aimed at wooing voters, not concrete steps towards starting dialogue and consultations with Tamils and other minorities.
It is not just Rajapaksa’s procrastination on a political solution to the ethnic conflict that is worrying India. Delhi is concerned over Tamil alienation. In the past, LTTE-led boycotts kept Tamils from voting, but even in a post-LTTE environment they have stayed away from the polls, with the turnout in Tamil areas very low in the recent election. Those Tamils who did vote did so in favor of Fonseka, who was backed by the Tamil National Alliance, a pro-LTTE party.
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party headed by Rajapaksa and the United People’s Freedom Alliance that Rajapaksa leads has a clear edge over the divided and battered opposition. The opposition is expected to focus on Fonseka’s arrest in its campaign for April’s parliamentary elections.
Delhi expects Rajapaksa’s party to win decisively. “The president is expected to emerge from the election with support in parliament that will be strong enough for him to push through changes required to resolve the ethnic conflict politically,” the Indian official said. But does he have the political will to do so?
Sudha Ramachandran - An independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
Kilde: Theglobalrealm.com
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