The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE

For the past quarter-century the Tamil diaspora has shaped the Sri Lankan political landscape through its financial and ideological support to the military struggle for an independent Tamil state. Although the May 2009 defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has dramatically reduced the diaspora’s influence, the majority of Tamils outside Sri Lanka continue to support a separate state, and the diaspora’s money can ensure it plays a role in the country’s future. The nature of that role, however, depends largely on how Colombo deals with its Tamil citizens in the coming months and on how strongly the international community presses the government to enact constitutional reforms to share power with and protect the rights of Tamils and other minorities. While the million-strong diaspora cannot regenerate an insurgency in Sri Lanka on its own, its money and organisation could turn up the volume on any violence that might eventually re-emerge.

Following the defeat of the LTTE, the mood in the diaspora has been a mix of anger, depression and denial. Although many had mixed feelings about the LTTE, it was widely seen as the only group that stood up for Tamils and won them any degree of respect. The Tigers’ humiliating defeat, the enormous death toll in the final months of the war and the internment of more than a quarter million Tamils left the diaspora feeling powerless, betrayed by the West, demanding justice and, in some cases, wanting revenge. A minority in the community is happy the LTTE is gone, since it directed much of its energy to intimidating and even killing those Tamils who challenged their rule.

Funding networks established by the LTTE over decades are seriously weakened but still in place. There is little chance, however, of the Tigers regrouping in the diaspora. LTTE leaders in Sri Lanka are dead or captured and its overseas structures are in disarray. Clinging to the possibility of victory long after defeat was inevitable damaged the LTTE’s credibility and weakened its hold on the community.

Nonetheless, most Tamils abroad remain profoundly committed to Tamil Eelam, the existence of a separate state in Sri Lanka. This has widened the gap between the diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Most in the country are exhausted by decades of war and are more concerned with rebuilding their lives under difficult circumstances than in continuing the struggle for an independent state. There is no popular support for a return to armed struggle. Without the LTTE to enforce a common political line, Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka are proposing substantial reforms within a united Sri Lanka. Unwilling to recognise the scale of defeat, and continuing to believe an independent state is possible, however, many diaspora leaders have dismissed Tamil politicians on the island either as traitors for working with the government or as too weak or scared to stand up for their people’s rights.

Many now reluctantly recognise the need for new forms of struggle, even if they would still prefer the LTTE fighting. New organisations have formed that are operating in more transparent and democratic ways than the LTTE and that aim to pressure Western governments to accept an independent state for Tamils. These include plans for a “transnational government of Tamil Eelam”, independent referenda among Tamils in various countries endorsing the call for a separate state, boycotts against products made in Sri Lanka and advocacy in support of international investigations into alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan state. The new initiatives, however, refrain from criticising the LTTE or holding it responsible for its own crimes or its contribution to the shattered state of Sri Lankan Tamil society.

So long as this is the case, most Western governments will remain sceptical of the diaspora’s post-LTTE political initiatives. All have kept the transnational government of Tamil Eelam at arm’s length given its resemblance to a government-in-exile, even if the group does not claim this status. Western governments will have little choice but to engage with the dominant, pro-separatist Tamil organisations, even if officials would prefer to deal only with the handful of interlocutors with a record of criticising the Tigers. But until it moves on from its separatist, pro-LTTE ideology, the diaspora is unlikely to play a useful role supporting a just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

Watching the devastation of the final months of the war and the seeming indifference of governments and the United Nations, many Tamils, particularly the younger generation born in the West, grew deeply disillusioned. Governments with large Tamil communities have been worried this might lead to new forms of militancy. In the last months of the war and months immediately following, there were self-immolations by Tamil protestors, vandalism against Sri Lankan embassies, and increased communal tensions between Tamils and Sinhalese abroad. While such events have grown less frequent, risks of radicalism in the diaspora cannot be dismissed entirely.

While Tamils have the democratic right to espouse separatism non-violently, Tamil Eelam has virtually no domestic or international backing. With the Sri Lankan government assuming Tamils abroad remain committed to violent means, the diaspora’s continued calls for a separate state feed the fears of the Rajapaksa administration and provide excuses for maintaining destructive anti-terrorism and emergency laws.

To ensure the current peace is a lasting one, the Sri Lankan government must address the legitimate grievances at the root of the conflict: the political marginalisation and physical insecurity of most Tamils in Sri Lanka. Statements made by President Mahinda Rajapaksa since his January 2010 re-election suggest there is little chance the needed political and constitutional reforms will be offered in his next term. Any significant improvement in the political position of Tamils and other minorities in Sri Lanka will thus come slowly and with difficulty, requiring significant shifts in the balance of political power within Sri Lanka as well as careful but tough persuasion from outside.

India, Japan, Western governments and multilateral organisations can do much more to assist the political empowerment of Tamils in Sri Lanka and press Colombo to address the causes behind the rise of the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups. There should be no blank cheque for Colombo to redevelop the north and east without first creating a political climate where Tamils and Muslims can freely express their opinions and have a meaningful role in determining the future of the areas where they have long been the majority. Donor governments and the UN should also press more strongly for an independent inquiry into the thousands of civilians, almost all Tamil, killed in the final months of fighting. Their aid should be tied to an end to impunity for human rights violations and abuses of political power that undermine democracy and threaten the freedoms of Sri Lankans from all ethnic communities.

தமிழீழத்தைப் பெற முடியுமா?

நாம் தெளிவாகச் சிந்தித்து அதன் அடிப்படையில் செயலாற்றும் காலம் வந்துள்ளது. நமக்கு என்ன வேண்டும்? தமிழீழம். அதைவிடக் குறைவான எதுவும் வேண்டாம். தமிழீழத்தைப் பெற முடியுமா?

நிச்சயமாக நம்மால் முடியும். நிச்சயமாக நம்மால் முடியும்.

எந்த நம்பிக்கையில் அப்படிச் சொல்கிறீர்கள்?

யூதர்களிடம் இருந்துபடிப்பினை தான் ! முற்றுமுழுதாக அழிக்கப்பட்ட பின்னர், அவர்களது மொழி கிட்டத்தட்ட வழக்கற்றுப் போகும் தருவாயில் இருந்த போதும் அவர்கள் சாம்பல் மேட்டில் இருந்து எழுந்த பீனிக்ஸ் பறவைபோல் மீண்டும் எழுந்தார்கள்!

நாம் என்ன செய்ய வேண்டும்?

யூதர்களின் வரலாற்றைப் படிப்போம் ! அது எந்தப் பதிப்பாக இருந்தாலும் பரவாயில்லை. அவை ஒரேமாதரியான வரலாற்றைத்தான் சொல்கின்றன. ஒருமுறை படித்து முடித்த பின்னர் செயலில் இறங்குங்கள்!

நாம் யூதர்களாக முடியுமா?

நம்மிடம் ஒற்றுமையில்லையே !

நாம் யூதர்களைப் போல் வரவேண்டும். அவர்கள் அய்க்கியமாக இருந்தார்கள் என்று யார் சொன்னது?

நாம் வேறு வேறு நாடுகளில் வாழும் 7 கோடி மக்கள். நம்மிடம் எல்லா வளமும் இருக்கின்றன. நாம் என்ன செய்ய வேண்டும்?

வீண் பேச்சுப் பேசுவதையும் எதிர்மறையாகப் பேசுவதையும் சிந்திப்பதையும் நிறுத்த வேண்டும். உங்களிடமும் மற்றவர்களிடமும் நம்பிக்கையை ஊட்டுங்கள்! இலக்கில் கண் வையுங்கள். ஆனால் அந்த இலக்கை அடைவதற்கு நடைமுறைச் சாத்தியமான வழிகளை உருவாக்குங்கள்!
பிரான்சுதமிழீழமக்கள்பேரவை , ஐரோப்பியதமிழ்மக்கள்அவை , அமெரிக்க தமிழர்களின் அரசியல் செயல் அவை, உலகளாவியதமிழர் பேரவை, பிரித்தானிய தமிழர் அவை, கனடிய தமிழர் பேரவை, பேர்ல் உள்ள அமைப்புக்கள் மற்றும் உள்ளுர் அமைப்புக்களை ஆதரியுங்கள். செயல் செய்யுங்கள், எண்ணங்களை, நேரம் மற்றும் வளங்களைவழங்குங்கள்.

புறக்கணிப்பு, ஆதரவுதேடுதல் போன்ற நடவடிக்கைகளில் ஈடுபடுங்கள்.

எல்லோரும் அழைத்து நான் என்ன செய்ய வேண்டும்? என்று கேட்கத் தொடங்கினால் நாம் வெற்றி பெறுவோம்! அழைப்புக்கு நீங்கள் காத்திருந்தால் நாம் வெற்றியடைய மாட்டோம்! ஓரு நாளில்ஒரு மணி நேரத்தையாவது செலவிடுங்கள்! எதைக் கொடுப்பது என்பதை நீங்கள் தீர்மானியுங்கள்.

மழையாகட்டும் வெய்யிலாகட்டும் தொடர்ந்து பங்களிப்புச் செய்யுங்கள்.

How strong are the “Boys”?

This article was first published in 1985 written by DBS Jeyaraj. Frontline Magazine is publised by the publishers of ‘THE HINDU’

TO the Western media they are guerillas, insurgents, separatists and rebels; sections of the Indian press describe them as nationalists, patriots and liberation fighters; back home the state which they oppose feels they are extremists, Marxists and plain terrorists; the people whose cause they claim to serve refer to them as the boys or the movement. Their own self-perception is that of revolutionary freedom-fighters seeking to liberate their people from oppression.

They are the militant organisations of the Sri Lankan Tamils who have adopted armed resistance as their creed in a bid to establish an independent state – Eelam, comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island. All militants are united on three aspects. A common aim – Eelam – is one. Common opposition to the present regime is another. Violent struggle as the means to the end is the third. But there ends the unity. For, despite the saying that adversity makes strange bedfellows, the Tamil militants remain divided. Personality clashes in the upper echelons of the movements, differences of ideological opinion, disagreement on strategy and methods, and so on are some reasons keeping the militants apart.

THE FAMOUS FIVE
Another point is the multiplicity of the groups. A recent count put the number at 23. They are of different kinds and hues. Some are well-organised and firmly entrenched on their native soil. Others are yet to develop as potent forces. Some are splinters who have defected or been expelled from major groups. A few have mushroomed around a particular village and adjacent areas; one or two are essentially trying to win freedom through stationery and pen. The groups that matter can be counted on the fingers of one’s hand.

The famous five are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS).

Of the other groups, one is the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), a breakaway from TELO. It was founded by an ex-employee of the Hotel Lanka Oberoi, known as “Oberoi” Devan. TELO has been deteriorating since his death. The group is supposed to be sitting on a large cache of weapons. It split into two recently. The Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) is led by Maheswaran, a one-time engineering student of the London University. Maheswaran, known as “Panagoda” for having escaped from the Army detention camp at the particular town, was detained in Madras also in connection with the Meenambakkam airport explosion. TEA pulled off the greatest bank robbery to date in Sri Lanka when it made off with 35 million Sri Lanka rupees from the Kattankudi People’s Bank. Some of the other groups are NLFT, TENA, TELE, RELO, ATAK, the Red Army, the Revolutionary Assembly and TEDC.

As far as the major groups are concerned, the LTTE, led by Prabakaran, has perhaps the most colourful past, active for over a decade. It claims credit for several incidents like the ambush of a CID team led by Inspector Bastianpillai, the bombing of an Avro, the ambush of 13 Army personnel preceding the 1983 violence and attacks on police stations and armed convoys. The Tigers have been constantly waging what they term as a guerilla war against the state. Their symbol, the Tiger, appeals to deep-seated nostalgia for a glorious Tamilian past – the halcyon days of the Cholas when the Tiger flag fluttered proudly. Today, to the average Tamil, the term “Tiger” is synonymous with the militant Tamil while in Sri Lanka the Sinhala word ‘Kotiya’ (tiger) is a derogatory reference to Tamils.

The group was formed in 1972. It changed its name from Tamil New Tigers to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976.

Umamaheswaran, an ex-surveyor, is the leader of PLOT. He was at one time the chairman of the Tigers’ executive council. He broke away and formed PLOT in 1980. The first-ever attack on a police station in the Lankan Tamil areas was pioneered by PLOT when it raided the Anaicottai police station in 1981. It was also responsible for the Kilinochchi bank robbery and the killing of several policemen. PLOT also operates a clandestine broadcasting station known as Voice of Tamil Eelam which conducts programmes in Tamil, English and Sinhala.

PUBLICITY - SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
The present leader of TELO is Sri Sabaratnam. It was set up by Thangathurai who, along with the controversial Kuttimani, was killed in the riot at Welikade prison. It remained a loosely knit group until 1973 when an organisational structure was formed. The group gunned down several Tamil police officers in the North. TELO received great publicity when its leader Thangathurai and Kuttimani were sentenced to death in 1982. Sri Sabaratnam took over in 1983. TELO made headlines recently by its operations in Chavakachcheri and Murukandy.

The chief of EPRLF is Padmanabha. It is a metamorphosis of earlier student and youth organisations dating back to 1975. The EPRLF umbrella was formed in 1981. It came into the open in 1983. The organisation comprises student, peasant, women, fishermen and worker groups. The front, which claimed a role in the Batticaloa prison break-out in 1983, received wide publicity by abducting an American couple last year. Recently it claimed responsibility for attacks on the Gurunagar Army cantonment and the Karainagar naval base.

EROS has a collective leadership represented by Rajanayagam in London and Balakumar in Madras. Its founder was an economist, Eliathamby Ratnasabapathy, who continues to play a godfather role. EROS had its origin in the Eelam Research Organisation established in London in 1975. It has perhaps the largest array of intellectuals in its fold. Its approach is basically Marxist-Leninist and it frowns upon acts like random killings or robberies. The primary aim is sabotage. EROS shot into the limelight through its three-phased bomb campaign in Colombo. The Oberoi Hotel and the National Security Ministry were the first targets. Oil refinery installations were the next. Thirdly, bombs were placed outside select targets. An attempt was also made on the TV antennae at Mount Pedro.

RELATIVE STRENGTH
The relative strength of the individual groups is another question. There are three main components in all groups – the fighter cadre, the propaganda unit, and the sympathiser reservoir. The fighters are the most important. All groups are wary of revealing their actual numbers and tend to exaggerate. Informed sources told Frontline that the five groups would together have close upon 10,000 fighting men. Numerical strength does not, of course, have a decisive bearing on combat skills or experience. Even the nature and quality of training differs considerably. There is disparity between as well as within the groups on issues like the intensity and period of training. In one assessment, in terms of combat fitness, the actual manpower mobilisation would be about 6,000. Another moot point is the lack of sufficient firepower. There is still a significant shortfall of firearms and dearth of ammunition.

“Which area is the stronghold of a particular group?” The answer is, “we are strong in all areas”. It is true to the extent that all groups are adequately represented in all Tamil areas as far as recruitment and influence are concerned. Recruitment cuts across religious, caste, regional and parochial lines. Each group has its concentration and spheres of special influence in different Tamil areas, with the “Tigers” having real strike power in the Jaffna peninsula and PLOT having its support spread out more widely. All these positions, however, are subject to rapid fluctuation as recruitment, shifts in loyalty, mobility and establishment of bases constitute in themselves an interacting process that is dynamic.

Among the upcountry plantation workers, Tamils of recent Indian origin, EROS and EPRLF enjoy real influence while PLOT is supported by a large number of Muslism.

The immediate challenge facing the militants is the question of unity. Unity is the upper most thought in the Tamil mind. The need of the hour, according to all groups, is not merely unity of purpose but coordinated action. PLOT Secretary-General Umamaheswaran went on the air over his radio and said, “The most important task facing us is the achieving of a degree of unity among the different groups and working out a common programme to face the common enemy. At present we are holding unity talks with a number of like-minded organisations and we have already reached unity with the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army and the National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam”.

EPRLF Secretary-General Padmanabha, addressing the front’s first congress, said, “It is important that we give our utmost attention to the formation of a united front. Today there are five major organisations within the Eelam national liberation movement. A united front has already been formed among EPRLF, EROS and TELO. Our prime task now is to strengthen the existing front and formulate correct tactics for the incorporation of PLOT and LTTE into the united front.”

LTTE ideologue Dr A.S. Balasingham struck an optimistic note when speaking to Frontline. “We feel that escalating conditions will compel the major liberation organisations to evolve a coordinated form of action. Negotiations have already been started between various groups to realise this objective. We are certain that all groups will join together to fight against our common enemy.”

Balakumar of EROS is also hopeful. “There are no fundamental contradictions between us. It is essentially a conflict of opinion which could be resolved in friendship in the interests of greater unity”, he told Frontline. Sri Sabaratnam, leader of TELO, explained: “There is no necessity for all the organisations to team up together. What is required is coordinated action.”

STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES
Obstacles in the way of [their] unity are strategic differences. Umamaheswaran of PLOT holds the following view: “Our differences with LTTE on the matter are basic. We are of the opinion that the hit and run actions of LTTE are putting back the liberation struggle and playing into the hands of [President J.R.] Jayewardene…. This is a short-sighted policy in the long run. I am sure that LTTE too will realise this.”

EPRLF spokesman Varadarajaperumal says his front does not believe in guerilla warfare as a strategy but merely as a tactic. “We do not believe in conventional war also. It was not adopted in any revolutionary struggle,” he says.

R. Vasudeva, additional secretary-general of PLOT, says that in the Sri Lankan context, hit and run policies alone will not succeed. Those tactics alone are not enough. A people’s army is also necessary.

Balakumar of EROS rejects the perpetuation of hit and run tactics. The hit and run policy is effective in the beginning of a guerilla war, thereafter it becomes redundant, he says.

TELO’s Sri Sabaratnam says, “The hit and run tactics were useful to demoralise the enemy when the militant groups were not ready to meet the enemy face to face. All the militant groups that matter are now in a position to meet the enemy face to face when necessary and inflict heavy losses by full-fledged military action…. We are not engaged in guerilla warfare exclusively. All we can say is that all militant groups that matter are now in a position to carry on a protracted war of national liberation.”

Anton Balasingham of the “Tigers” says there is some confusion over the concept of people’s war. “People’s war is not popular insurrection. Guerilla warfare is an aspect of a people’s war. Gradually and systematically, guerilla warfare would clearly evolve into popular warfare. Units of Tamil guerillas will continue with their protracted warfare until the final war of liberation.” He is also hopeful of unity. “No fundamental contradictions exist as far as objectives are concerned – all major groups are committed to similar aims like the formation of an independent socialist Eelam and armed revolutionary struggle as the means to achieve this. Differences lie in methods of armed resistance, which can be resolved by discussions and negotiation.”

A further deterrent to unity is the personality clash between Prabakaran and Umamaheswaran. The bitter feud culminated in a shootout at Pondy Bazaar resulting in both being put behind bars in Madras for a while. There have also been episodes of fratricide between PLOT and LTTE on Eelam soil. Mutual vilification campaigns have also been conducted. A hopeful pointer to the future is that both sides realise the need for unity. An LTTE representative met Umamaheswaran for a preliminary discussion. Another expatriate who is influential with the Tigers also is actively pursuing this line.

Positive signs of a future union lie in the roots of the past itself. An analysis of the origins of each group shows the common seed was sown in 1970 when medium-wise standardisation policies discriminating against Tamils in the higher education sphere were introduced. Student disgruntlement snowballed into open dissent. The demonstration effect of the abortive armed insurgency by Sinhala radicals as well as the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 gave momentum to this dissent. The Pan-Sinhala constitution of 1972, the teargassing of the crowd at the World Tamil Research Conference in 1974 and the suicide of youth leader Sivakumaran helped fuel these feelings to the point of revolt. Most militant leaders have worked together before.

COMMON COMMITMENT
There is no serious ideological cleavage among the Tamil militants. All the groups are committed to a socialist State of Eelam, and EPRLF and EROS are considered truly radical. Common origin, common purpose and lack of basic ideological differences are indeed notable. A group of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka is now actively engaged in promoting unity. A spokesman for the group said the “Tigers” had laid a precondition at one stage that unity could be discussed only if the other groups also entered the fray. The inactivity of the other groups while the “Tigers” were fighting it out, made LTTE suspicious. LTTE was wary of wearing itself out while the other groups were conserving their strength. Today that situation is fast changing, with TELO and EPRLF embarking upon major operations.

The spokesman summed up the situation thus. TELO, EPRLF and EROS have formed a front. PLOT and TELA are together. Actually, the five groups have formed a coordination committee. The “Tigers” are remaining aloof. The basic difference is between PLOT and LTTE. The TELO-EPRLF-EROS umbrella is holding discussions with both PLOT and the “Tigers”. Both sides seem to be acceptable to them. If comprehensive unity cannot be achieved at the initial stage, the trio can align with either PLOT or LTTE and intensify operations. In that context, the third force cannot be inactive. It would fall in line with parallel action that would gradually lead to coordinated action. All small groups would toe the line of the big groups and become progressively assimilated.

There are other factors which also add impetus to the drive for unity. The Tamil people facing great hardship in Sri Lanka are constantly pressuring the groups to unite. The average Sri Lankan Tamil is not partisan towards any group. To him all militants are the “boys” and the current inter-group rivalry demoralises him greatly. If the groups do not take heed of this, they run the risk of losing their support among the people.

The rank and file of the different groups have no basic differences among themselves. Brothers, neighbours, relatives and friends are split among different groups. Thus internal pressure rising from the grass root level is bound to be another motivator.

Many expatriate Tamils who are the main funding agencies are becoming slowly disillusioned. Several of them are actively engaged in promoting unity. Public opinion in India, a country which has shown much openness towards Tamil refugees, is watchful. Indian sentiments both on a State and national level have been advocating unity. Sympathetic newspapers, politicians and student organisations are all urging it.

Last but not least is the growing awareness that taking on the armed might of an organised state requires a pooling of resources and coordinated effort. Such unity would also mean more funds, more arms and more men. Significant political and diplomatic advances in the international arena could also be made. And so the search for militant unity goes on. Time is short and the waters continue to rise. History will record whether the militants will sink or swim together and also how they relate to the overall movement of the Tamils of Sri Lanka, especially the political component represented by TULF [Tamil United Liberation Front].

Kilde: The Hindu

Ein sensitiv formidlar

Dhayalan Velauthapillai Forskar og professor ved Høgskolen i Bergen.

Då alt brann opp i krigen på Sri Lanka, fann Dhayalan Velauthapillai ut at han måtte bort.

Frå han kom som ingeniørstudent til Bergen i 1984 og fram til i dag, som professor ved Høgskolen i Bergen (HiB) og eldsjel for minoritetars integrering, har engasjementet drive Dhayalan Velauthapillai til stor suksess i det norske samfunnet.

Nyleg blei han kåra til ein av dei ti fyrstegenerasjonsinnvandrarane som har inntatt ei leiande rolle i norsk arbeids- og samfunnsliv. Prosjektet skal vise «vegen til suksess» og byggje rollemodellar av internasjonale personar som har lukkast i Norge. Han ler kledeleg sjenert på spørsmål om korleis han har fått så stor suksess.

– Eg blei veldig audmjuk og glad. Det var veldig lite forventa. Det er sikkert mange som har hatt mykje meir suksess enn meg. Utan engasjementet hadde eg ikkje vore mykje.

Dhayalan, som er norsk-tamilar, har engasjert seg i eit utal organisasjonar og utval som arbeider for minoritetar. Kjepphestane hans er høgare utdanning og meir samfunnsdeltaking.

– Det er ein føresetnad for å bli integrert i Noreg. Deretter må vi gi noko tilbake til samfunnet, ivrar eldsjela, medan han serverer kokande tevatn til alle utanom seg sjølv.

FØDT PROFESSOR
Dhayalan sitt liv står i stil med bodskapen hans. Han visste til dømes allereie som åtteåring at han ville bli professor. Barndommen på Sri Lanka var prega av snakk om undertrykking og diskriminering frå styresmaktene.

– Det vekka engasjementet i meg. Eg blei politisk bevisst i byrjinga av barneskulen. På ungdomsskulen var eg med i fleire politiske foreiningar.

Han understrekar samtidig at det tamilske samfunnet han vaks opp i romma meir enn misnøye.

– Vi var veldig knytt til kvarandre. Familie og naboar. Vi hadde heile tida ei kjensle av at vi ikkje var aleine. På den måten lærer du å tenkje på dei rundt deg meir enn den materialistiske verda.

Han trur det kan vere noko av grunnen til at han i dag har så mange ulike engasjement.

– Eg har veldig problem med å seie nei. Ofte har eg to avtalar samtidig. Eg får ei god kjensle av å ha ofra tida mi for andre. Tamilane er slik.

FLYKTA FRÅ BOMBEREGNET
Etter krigen braut ut, var det ingeniørstudiet som førte Dhayalan til Noreg og Bergen.

– Alt hadde brent opp. Då tenkte eg at eg måtte søke meg bort, begynne på nytt.

Medan den vordande professoren underviste medstudentar i realfag på fritida, møtte han kvinna som i dag er kona hans. I dag nyt dei livet i Bergen med fire søner i alderen åtte til 18 år.

– Det er veldig roleg her, ganske optimalt. Ikkje så mange folk, men likevel er det ein by. Med fjell, legg han til.  Fjell som han likar betre å sjå på enn å gå i.

– Eg er ikkje flink å gå tur, men eg er fanga av den nydelege naturen, eg nyt det, seier han, som om han les poesi.

GRIN OFTE
Det er i Bergen han ser ei framtid for seg og familien.

– Bergen er heimen vår no. Eg har budd i Noreg lenger enn eg har budd på Sri Lanka.

Saknet til fødelandet forsvinn likevel ikkje. Smilet forsvinn når han tenkjer på det som har skjedd.

– I 2003 hadde eg høge ambisjonar. Eg var med i prosjekt med fleire organisasjonar om universitetssamarbeid med Universitetet i Bergen, men mange av dei som engasjerte seg, døydde då krigen blussa opp igjen. Framleis veit eg ikkje skjebnen til venene mine.

Store interneringsleirar husar i dag over 100 000 tamilar. Dhayalan tenker mykje på dei.– Eg var med og gjekk i demonstrasjonstog for dei i vinter. Vi må ta kraftig avstand frå uretten. Det er eit folkemord, men ingen snakkar om det.

Stemmen er roleg. Augo er alvorlege og munnen dirrar svakt. Kjenslene lar seg ikkje stoppe, ifølgje han sjølv.

– Eg er engasjert og sensitiv. Viss eg ser nokon som lir, begynner eg å grine med ein gong. Eg blir sint, men er tolmodig.

LES MINDRE
Dhayalan opplevde stor forskjell på å vere student i Sri Lanka og Noreg.

– Der måtte tamilane ha høgare karakterar enn singhalesarar for å kome inn på studiet. Det førte til at dei som kom inn skulle verkeleg jobba.

Slik var det ikkje i Noreg.

– Det var avslappa her. Ansvaret låg hos kvar enkelt student. Var ein engasjert kunne ein nå langt. På Sri Lanka var det professorane som bestemte alt, vi var redde for å snakke fritt.

Som førelesar har han følgd utviklinga på studentane. Han opplever at vi bruker stadig mindre tid på lesesalen.

– Mange jobbar for å dekke ein materialistisk livsstil. Dei innser ikkje alvoret før dei begynner på master.

– Er dagens studentar er meir sjølvopptatte?

– Nokon, men langt frå alle. Studentane før hadde meir til opprør, trur han, men skundar seg å leggje til at han ikkje vil sei noko negativt om studentar.

LEVER FOR STUDENTANE
Han set seg lenger og lenger fram på sofaen. Dei mørke augene er store og levande, det kvite smilet breitt.
– Du ser du blir godt mottatt og at andre får glede av den kunnskapen du legg fram for dei. Ikkje alle er så heldige med jobben sin, seier han fleire gonger.

Gleda over faget og undervisninga har smitta over på studentane. Dei har løna han med tittelen «Årets førelesar» på HiB allereie første året han føreleste på høgskulen.

- Løyndommen bak ei god førelesing er å sjå kvar enkelt student, trur den populære kunnskapsformidlaren.

– Eg prøver å sjå alle ansikta, prøver å lese korleis dei tenkjer. Eg er opptatt av at einkvar skal forstå. Ser eg at dei ikkje gjer det, får eg dårleg samvit. Eg føler det er mitt ansvar at dei får nytte av førelesinga.

– Eg går rundt og spør om dei lurer på noko, og dei kjem og snakkar med meg på kontoret. Eg blir rørt over at dei føler dei kan kome til meg når dei treng hjelp.

– Det høyres ut som du har funne draumejobben din?

– Ja! Eg er veldig privilegert. Når eg føreleser er eg alltid på overtid. Når du trivest og ser at arbeidet nyttar, merkar du ikkje at tida går.

LITE FAMILIETID
Det krev sin mann å vera engasjert i så mykje både profesjonelt og på frivillig basis. Han vedgår at det har gått utover familien.

– Eg har ikkje brukt mykje tid på familien. Tida då barna var små kjem aldri tilbake. Men når eg reiser, passar eg på alltid å vere tilbake same dagen, skundar han å leggje til.

Han trekk fram den tamiliske laurdagsskulen, der heile familien tek del, som positivt for alle partar. Men sjølv eldsjeler må kople av. Saman med sønene følgjer han med på Brann, men favoritten er cricket. Elles blir det mange debattprogram, historiske filmar og tamilsk musikk. Realisten har nemleg ein musikar i magen.

– Eg syng av og til, men viss eg skulle gjort noko om igjen skulle eg lært meg å spele gitar. Eg trur det gir energi. Å spele må vere den beste måten kople av lesinga på.

EIN TANKEVEKKJER
Dhayalan lærte mykje norsk ved å bu på Fantoft. Den gongen budde det mange norske studentar der, men ikkje alle var like inkluderande. Han trur dagens studentar er meir verdsvante og derfor flinkare å ta kontakt sjølv, men ber oss tenkje oss om i møte med framandspråklege.

– Tenk viss du var aleine i eit anna land. Det er ikkje like lett for alle å ta initiativ då. Har ein i tillegg språkvanskar krevst det endå meir. Dei som er ein del av majoriteten må ta ansvar.

Og dette engasjementet, ifølgje han sjølv, finst det ei god oppskrift på.

– Vi må aldri samanlikne oss med dei rikaste, men med dei som har det vondt. Då kjem engasjementet av seg sjølv.

Dhayalan Velauthapillai
Forskar og professor ved Høgskolen i Bergen.
Foreleser i fysikk- og teknologifag.
Født på Sri Lanka i 1964.
Bur no i Bergen.
Kjent for sitt engasjement for tamilar både i Bergen og på Sri Lanka.

Kilde: studvest.no

India uneasy over Sri Lanka’s slide

Developments in neighboring Sri Lanka are triggering unease in India. There is growing concern that President Mahinda Rajapaksa will use his second term to marginalize political rivals rather than seek a political solution to the island’s ethnic conflicts.

The arrest last week of General Sarath Fonseka, former army chief and Rajapaksa’s losing rival in the presidential election in January, is fueling fears that the president is focusing on consolidating the already substantial grip of his family over the levers of power rather than on addressing the country’s bigger problems.

Rajapaksa’s convincingly won the presidential election by a margin of 1.8 million votes. The vote was fiercely fought with the two front-runners and their supporters engaging in personal attacks.

It was far from the days when Fonseka and Rajapaksa partnered in the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that the Sri Lankan army finally won in May last year. The army chief and the premier both tried to take the credit for the victory, with Rajapaksa attempting to sideline Fonseka by “promoting” him to a largely ceremonial post. This was bitterly resented Fonseka, who decided to enter the presidential race as the opposition parties’ main candidate.

Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka have long records of getting even with enemies and silencing dissent, it was only a matter of time before they turned on each other. That the victor in the presidential election would show no mercy on the vanquished was evident in the election campaign.

Rajapaksa did not even wait for results to be officially announced before he began the witch-hunt, with troops surrounding the hotel where Fonseka and his aides were staying. The general was allowed to leave the hotel the next day, but several former army officers who were part of his election campaign team were arrested.

There has been no let-up in the intensity of the crackdown on the Fonseka camp in the weeks since. The president has purged the army of Fonseka supporters. Fourteen senior officers have been forced to retire and around 40 serving and former soldiers arrested. Early last week, troops arrested Fonseka.

While the army is yet to press formal charges against him, a government-owned newspaper says that charges could include “conspiracy to carry out a military coup against the government and a bid to assassinate President Rajapaksa”. He could face a court-martial if the allegations are proved.

Many in Sri Lanka believe that Fonseka and his supporters in the army were plotting a coup and hence deserve to be arrested. Others fear that it is part of a larger strategy to eliminate all opposition to Rajapaksa’s rule.

Sri Lanka has been one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies. But leaders have grown increasingly autocratic and under Rajapaksa the slide towards authoritarian rule has been rapid. This has evoked apprehension in the island and beyond. Several countries have expressed concern over Fonseka’s arrest.

Neighboring India issued a cautious statement after a day’s silence following the arrest. “As a friend and neighbor, we trust that due processes of law will be observed in democratic Sri Lanka,” a spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said.

Officials speaking to Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity said that while India was “no supporter of a general entering politics, it is not happy with Rajapaksa’s undemocratic style”.

During the run-up to the elections, both Rajapaksa and Fonseka seem to have sought India’s support or at least a commitment that India would not sway the all-important Tamil vote by indicating its preference between the two candidates.

Fonseka made a “private visit” to Mumbai, apparently to open a line of communication with Indian political leaders, while Rajapaksa’s brothers, Basil and Gotabhaya – senior advisor to the president and defense secretary respectively – met with top Indian officials as part of a Sri Lankan delegation. They are reported to have briefed Delhi about the steps taken by Rajapaksa to resettle the Tamil Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and to have assured the Indian government of Rajapaksa’s commitment to finding a political solution to the long-running ethnic conflict between the island’s Sinhalese majority and the Tamils and other minorities.

Throughout the presidential campaign India refrained from indicating a preference between the two front-runners. Senior officials told Asia Times Online then that there was little difference between Rajapaksa and Fonseka as both prioritized the military option over a political settlement to deal with ethnic-based problems.

“Rajapaksa stubbornly resisted exploring a political solution right through his first term despite India constantly urging him to do so,” a MEA official pointed out. “And both [Rajapaksa and Fonseka] showed little concern for Tamil civilian lives through the months of aerial bombardment of Tamil areas.”

India saw Rajapaksa and Fonseka as presenting “a choice between the devil and the deep-blue sea,” but Delhi quietly hoped for Rajapaksa’s return to power.

“Rajapaksa is a known devil, unlike Fonseka,” the official said, pointing out that “as a politician, Fonseka was an unknown entity”. A career soldier, Fonseka entered the political arena late last year. But for his political agenda of settling scores with Rajapaksa, little is known of his “vision” for the country.

India knew that Fonseka was pro-Pakistan and China. And that worked in Rajapaksa’s favor. While Sri Lanka warmed to both Pakistan and China during Rajapaksa’s first term, with economic and especially defense ties expanding significantly, “Rajapaksa kept India in the loop right through the war against the LTTE,” a fact that was appreciated in decision-making circles in Delhi.

Another point that worked against Fonseka was that he is an ex-military man. Fonseka resigned before he stepped into the political arena and hence did not enter politics via a military coup, but India was uneasy with a military man taking over the reins in Sri Lanka.

Rajapaksa’s victory therefore evoked a sigh of relief in Delhi
Delhi was hoping that with his re-election out of the way, Rajapaksa would quickly settle down to addressing the ethnic conflict. But there have been no signs or statements issued on this matter in the three weeks since his landslide victory. Instead, the government has been preoccupied with clipping Fonseka’s wings.

Last week, the president dissolved parliament and announced that general elections would be held in April. What can be expected from him and other politicians in the coming weeks is campaign rhetoric on the ethnic issue aimed at wooing voters, not concrete steps towards starting dialogue and consultations with Tamils and other minorities.

It is not just Rajapaksa’s procrastination on a political solution to the ethnic conflict that is worrying India. Delhi is concerned over Tamil alienation. In the past, LTTE-led boycotts kept Tamils from voting, but even in a post-LTTE environment they have stayed away from the polls, with the turnout in Tamil areas very low in the recent election. Those Tamils who did vote did so in favor of Fonseka, who was backed by the Tamil National Alliance, a pro-LTTE party.

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party headed by Rajapaksa and the United People’s Freedom Alliance that Rajapaksa leads has a clear edge over the divided and battered opposition. The opposition is expected to focus on Fonseka’s arrest in its campaign for April’s parliamentary elections.

Delhi expects Rajapaksa’s party to win decisively. “The president is expected to emerge from the election with support in parliament that will be strong enough for him to push through changes required to resolve the ethnic conflict politically,” the Indian official said. But does he have the political will to do so?

Sudha Ramachandran - An independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.

Kilde: Theglobalrealm.com

A missed opportunity for Sri Lanka

'Until Sri Lanka government and the international community address the dire human-rights situation, the deterioration of the rule of law, and legitimate Tamil grievances, Sri Lanka will remain mired in turmoil' - Brad Adams, Asia Director, Human Rights Watch.

It would be naïve to expect anything other than propaganda from a head of state, but the piece by Mr. Rajapaksa is more dangerous than hubris - Asoka Wijeweera, London.

Wall Street Journal published three responses to the article by Mahinda Rajapaksa on WSJ under the caption "Sri Lanka Looks to the Future." He said "our people are free of threats, fear and terrorism. The government will work hard for all of them."

Comment by Brad Adams, Asia Director,Human Rights Watch

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa's plans sound good on paper ("Sri Lanka Looks to the Future," op-ed, Feb. 4), but until his government and the international community address the dire human-rights situation, the deterioration of the rule of law, and legitimate Tamil grievances, Sri Lanka will remain mired in turmoil.

More than 7,000 civilians died last year in what the United Nations called a "bloodbath" for which government forces as well as the Tamil Tigers were responsible. Yet the government has reneged on commitments to conduct a serious investigation. The president's ongoing crackdown on civil society, which has continued since election day, has resulted in killings, disappearances and unlawful arrests, and has caused many journalists and rights activists to flee the country.

Were Mr. Rajapaksa sincere about addressing the genuine grievances of all of Sri Lanka's communities, he would permit an independent international investigation into alleged abuses by both sides. And he would end the violence and harassment against peaceful critics of the government. Those concerned about Sri Lanka's future, whether to visit or to invest, should insist that respect for human rights be part of that vision. Only then will the stage be set for true reconciliation and a peaceful and prosperous Sri Lanka.

Asoka Wijeweera, London
It would be naïve to expect anything other than propaganda from a head of state, but the piece by Mr. Rajapaksa is more dangerous than hubris.

The presidential election was certainly quiet by Sri Lankan standards but hardly free and fair. Media outlets critical of the government were shut down, one newspaper editor has been arrested, another is still missing and even the state television station was commandeered by the military.

By writing in The Wall Street Journal Asia, Mr. Rajapaksa is trying to suppress these reports and avert international eyes from his crackdown on critics. The police and army have been purged of would-be threats and the "state of emergency" has been extended. Mr. Rajapaksa is consolidating his grip on the island.

Although he uses run-of-the-mill rhetoric to dismiss critics, the truth is that Sri Lanka needs more help from the international community than an IMF loan. The island might be a middle-income emerging market but inflation and unemployment are high, and the loss of preferential tariffs in the EU will hurt. Hence the feeble attempt to improve his reputation and the plea for aid.

Freedom of speech is a right that everyone should have. But by printing Mr. Rajapaksa's piece, the Journal not only contributes to the erosion of truth but bestows on him something routinely denied to the Sri Lankan media and public: a chance to say what he thinks, however unpalatable it may be.

Comments by Sashi Selvendran and Ashwini Vasanthakumar, Lanka Solidarity, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Rajapaksa correctly observes that his country's presidential elections were historic. But if the rest of his blinkered piece is any indication, Mr. Rajapaksa seems poised to miss this historic opportunity.

Mr. Rajapaksa gestures only vaguely toward a political solution and minority grievances, dwelling instead on Sri Lanka's potential for investors and tourists. Certainly economic development is necessary for sustainable peace, but this should neither substitute for nor distract from the critical challenges of reconciliation among the country's multiple communities, implementation of a permanent political solution and the demilitarization and democratization of society.

This last point is deeply concerning. Mr. Rajapaksa seems to believe these most recent elections were "peaceful" and "well-fought." Independent election monitoring centers, however, found more than 900 instances of election violence. Despite the war's end, he makes no mention of implementing parts of the Sri Lankan Constitution that would devolve power to local authorities, giving various communities more of a say.

The demise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam signals the possibility of a democratic future for a long-brutalized society. But in its postbellum conduct, the government of Sri Lanka under Mr. Rajapaksa has shown us that terrorism is not the only threat to democracy.

Mahinda Rajapaksa said in his article to WSJ:
January 26 was an historic day for Sri Lanka. It was the first presidential election for more than 25 years that was unaffected by the terrorism and intimidation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, otherwise known as the Tamil Tigers. The overwhelming majority of Sri Lankans who exercised their democratic right last Tuesday voted for an end to division, an end to terrorism and for a new beginning of peace and prosperity. I am proud that the election was well fought, but peaceful on voting day. All who wished to participate, could.

Kilde: Tamil National